Conflict Watch

Places where conflict is likely (or not likely) in the (near) future:

In Mozambique, today, the latest peace negotiations between Mozambique's government and former rebels moved forward with cautious optimism:

After 11 rounds of talks aimed at resolving the crisis, news finally came Monday that the government and Renamo had reached a partial agreement to change electoral laws -- an announcement that was broadly welcomed.

Election violence is likely in Bangladesh this year given the amount of violence from the court rulings on war criminals

More than 100 people have been killed since January in political violence sparked by verdicts handed down by the International Crimes Tribunal.

Mexico is likely to see more violence even though Miguel Ángel Treviño Morales was caught yesterday.  One might think that his capture would lead to less violence, but his capture essentially leads to a power vacuum that could lead to more violence, as rivals within the Zetas fight for power and as other cartels move to take advantage of the Zeta's leadership struggle.  Jamie Haase, a former special agent with ICE, the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency says:

But as always happens in the drug war, any time you remove a person from an extremely lucrative position, there will be others waiting to take their place. The net result may be more violence as others rush into fill the power vacuum created by law enforcement’s intervention.

Lastly, does poverty lead to conflict (an age old question with no resolution)?:

Asia has by far the highest number of conflicts, and the longest running conflicts," according to according to a new study of subnational conflict on the continent from the Asia Society. The authors, Thomas Parks, Nat Colletta, Ben Oppenheim, identified 26 subnational conflicts, ranging from Kashmir to Aceh to southern Thailand, affecting 50 percent of the countries in South and Southeast Asia between 1992 and 2012. But when you look at where these conflicts are taking place, a lot of preconceived notions about the relationship between development and violence don't hold seem to hold up.  

Russian Helicopters and the UN

Ever wonder why nearly all UN helicopters are flown by Russians?

Russian entrepreneurs have turned the Soviet-era air fleet into a thriving business, supplying the U.N. and other international agencies with low-cost surplus aircraft, including Antonov transport planes and Mi-8 and Mi-26 helicopters. The low-cost aircraft -- which Russian factories continue to produce -- have largely dissuaded Western air operators from competing for U.N. contracts, which must go to the lowest bidder. Russian companies now account for about 75 percent of all contracts for commercial helicopters, the most lucrative segment of U.N. peacekeeping's multibillion-dollar marketplace.

They may not be the safest.   But, even the US is buying them.

Sunday Links

• Oregon is getting it right when it comes to higher education
• Georgia's syllabus experiment
• Testing the prisoner's dilemma on prisoners 
• This is pretty cool and so is this 
• Protect male sperm!
• Education for Saudi women
• Men better vote in Zimbabwe or else...
• Portuguese migrants settle in Mozambique

Sexism and misogyny this week:

• California has been sterilizing female prisoners 
• Sexism's stamina
• "Have I dreamt about having a model contract? No. Im sorry. But have I dreamed about winning Wimbledon? Absolutely, yes."  
• Misogyny lives on in Australia 
• Lost girls and prostitution
• Sexual harassment and rape in Egypt
• Why cops don't listen to rape victims
• Street harassment a global epidemic

On Yemen

Given that I think that Yemen is going to be making headlines in the near future (see demands for secession, drones, weapons trade, democratic transition - we all know transitions = violence, elections in 2014, humanitarian crises, and continued violence)

Some facts about Yemen:

• Yemen is the first state on the Arabian Peninsula to enfranchise women and boasts a multiparty electoral system. 
• Female literacy rate 46.8% (CIA World Factbook) 
• There is a child bride problem 
• Yemen is the poorest Arab state  
• Yemen has the second largest military force on the Arabian Peninsula after Saudi Arabia

Concerns:

•  In January 2009, the Saudi and Yemeni al-Qaeda branches merged to form Al-Quaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). 
• The Yemeni army launched a fresh offensive against the Shia insurgents in 2009, assisted by Saudi forces.
• By 2012 there has been a "small contingent of U.S. special-operations troops" in addition to CIA and "unofficially acknowledged" U.S. military presence in response to increasing terror attacks by AQAP on Yemeni citizens

Political Context: 

Creation of North Yemen:   The  Ottomon Empire retreated form the region in 1918.  After much feudal competition, in February 1968, the Yemen Arab Republic was formed. 

Creation of South Yemen:  The Aden Emergency contributed to the end of British rule.  In November 1967, the Peoples Democratic Republic was created. 

Relations between the two states were mostly friendly.  But, in October 1972, fighting erupted between north and south; North Yemen supplied by Saudi Arabia and South Yemen by the USSR. Fighting was short-lived and the conflict led to the October 28, 1972 Cairo Agreement, mediated by the Arab League, which set forth a plan to unify the two countries.    Because of the discovery of natural gas and oil, in 1988, the two governments came to an understanding that reduced tensions and paved the way for unification in 1990.

The 1990's  The Republic of Yemen was born in 1990 with the unification of the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen). The new state, governed by a multiparty parliament and former president of the north, Ali Abdullah Saleh, struggled to unify the two countries’ economies and militaries.  In a climate of mutual hostility and distrust, on May 21, 1994, leaders of the former South Yemen declared secession and the establishment of a new Democratic Republic of Yemen centered in Aden.  (Vice President al-Beidh withdrew to Aden and said he would not return unless norther violence against the Yemeni Socialist Party stopped as well as ending economic marginalization of the south).  However, the south failed to achieve any international recognition and the south was defeated.  Saleh’s troops captured Aden in July, ending the brief civil war. The Yemen Socialist Party, the former governing party of the south boycotted the 1997 elections. In September 1999, Yemen held its first direct presidential election, reelecting President Saleh to a five-year term by an overwhelming margin.

The 2000's:  Saleh was reelected in September 2006, in the nation’s first truly competitive presidential race, during which the opposition coalition Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) fielded former Minister of Oil Faisal Bin Shamlan.  Bin Shamlan received 21.8 percent of the vote – an unprecedented showing for an opposition candidate in Yemen. In October 2007, Saleh announced a package of comprehensive political reforms; however, many were not slated to take effect until after his term  

By early 2009, the ruling GPC and the opposition coalition of the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) reached a political impasse, which ultimately delayed parliamentary elections for two years. Fomenting unrest across the country began to gain significant momentum the following year as demonstrators demanded equal employment opportunities, better service delivery and stronger local administrative authority. The government responded by implementing a series of crackdowns on dissent.  By February 2011, the Arab Spring reached Yemen as hundreds of civic and young opposition party activists held daily protests.  The crisis peaked March 18 when gunmen opened fire on unarmed demonstrators in the capital, killing more than 60 people and injuring hundreds more. Youth-led protests grew to encompass hundreds of thousands of demonstrators who took up permanent positions in 14 “Change Squares” across the country.

In February 2011, frequent protests escalated into a popular uprising driven by hundreds of thousands of unemployed or underemployed youth.  Demonstrators initially called for greater job opportunities, better public service delivery and a more accountable government; as unrest gained momentum, protestors demanded that then-President Ali Abdullah Saleh, in office for 33 years, and his government resign. The government responded by cracking down on demonstrators. After nearly 11 months of popular protests calling for his removal, Saleh signed the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) initiative and an accompanying set of implementation mechanisms on Nov. 23, 2011, transferring presidential authorities to Vice President Abdo Rabu Mansour Hadi. In accordance with the GCC agreement, a presidential election took place Feb. 21, 2012, to confirm uncontested Hadi as the president who would oversee a two-year transition.

(From NDI)

Weekend Links

• Boys with sisters are more likely to be Republican
• We are asking men the wrong question when it comes to violence against women
• Responding to Anne-Marie Slaughter and Sheryl Sandberg
• Freida Pinto says the film industry is too male dominated
• Coming to a refugee camp near you: Ikea
• Brazilian youth entry into drug gangs
• Cell phones cause war?

Female IR Bloggers

Last week, Political Violence @ a Glance, asked where are all the female international relations (IR) bloggers.   This week Taylor Marvin and Barbara F. Walter answered that question with four main points: 

1.  High barriers to entry into the elite blogosphere.  Almost all have PhDs, are tenured, and from elite universities, which means they are more likely to be men.  There are fewer women with the credentials.  

This point goes hand in hand with "Do babies matter"?  Evidence suggests that female academics are "punished" for having families, which might explain the low numbers of women in IR as tenured faculty.  This means ensuring that universities pay attention to the types of barriers that women face in academia and address them. 

 2.  Women are simply not being asked to participate in blogs as often as are men. 

This means that prominent blogs should reach out to women, but it also means that women should reach out to prominent blogs.  The book Lean In talks about how women hold back when it comes to "sitting at the table."  The natural tendency for many women is to wait to be called on instead of volunteering an opinion.  This does not hold for all women though, just think about "Maya" from Zero Dark Thirty. 

3.  The blogosphere could deter greater female participation. Female bloggers are more likely to be dismissed for their gender than male bloggers.

Again, this a point made in Lean In. Women are just not taken as seriously as men when it comes to being experts on topics that have traditionally been dominated by men.  Both men and women are culprits when it comes to subtle and not so subtle remarks about the competency of women at their job.  The moral of the story is to stop assuming that "female x got the job because she is woman."  Instead, try reading her work and commenting on it. 

4.  Women may simply be less interested in blogging about professional topics than men because women simply have less time to blog than men, women are less confident in their opinions, and/or because women are less likely to self-promote than men.

The first explanation (the time factor) is perhaps the answer that most women would give if asked the question about why they do not blog.  The other two explanation are difficult to discern (without conducting an experiment, and experiments do suggest this as Marvin and Walter point out). 

Another reason there might not be many female bloggers is because 

Women and Remittances

Today's New York Times article about women and remittances in the Gulf region made me think about some of the problems related to reporting about women.  Much of it portrays women as carrying the weight when men do not (though subtle in this article, there is still a tone that women are "fueling" remittances), and applaud women for doing so.   

I find two main issues with the article. 

First, there is no mention of the negative consequences for women (and men) who work as migrant labor.  Reports and stories about the mistreatment of men and women in the Gulf region show that many are exploited.  Many are trafficked and have to work off their debt.  In many cases, women are trafficked as sex slaves, after being promised jobs as domestic workers.  Here is a counter narrative to the one in the New York Times article. 

Second, the article does not talk about the toll on women.  It mentions how many women leave their families to send money home, but the emotional toll for doing this can be high.  With all the talk about women balancing work and family life in the US (also this), I have yet to see a worthwhile discussion about female migrants and the choices they have to make to put food on the table.